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Sessòes e Leituras:
1ª Sessão: Transaction Costs and the
diversity of modes of organization.
• The different levels of a market
economy and their interaction.
• The different approaches. Why New Institutional
Economics?
• Institutional Environment and modes of
organization: defining the fundamental concepts
• Transaction Costs: Assumptions, concept,
operationality.
• Application: Measuring transaction costs?
Reading List:
Alchian, Armen A. 1965 “Some Economics of
Property Rights”. Il Politico, 30 (4): 816-819.
Reprinted in Alchian 1977 Economic Forces at Work.
Indianapolis: Liberty Press
*Alchian, Armen; Demsetz, Harold 1972 "Production,
Information Costs and Economic Organization".
American Economic Review, 62 (5): 777-795
Barzel, Yoram 1982 "Measurement Costs and
the Organization of Markets". Journal of
Law and Economics. 25 (2): 27-48.
**Coase, Ronald H. 1991 "The Institutional
Structure of Production". Alfred Nobel Memorial
Prize Lecture in Economic Sciences. Nobel Foundation:
12 pages. Reprint in American Economic Review,
1992, 82 (4): 713-719.
*Demsetz, Harold 1968 "The Cost of Transacting".
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 82 (1): 33-53
*Leffler, Keith B., Randal P. Rucker and Jan A.
Munn (2000), ‘Transaction Costs and the
Collection of Information: Presale Measurement
on Private Timber Sales’, Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 16 (1), 166-88
**Menard, Claude 1995 "Markets as Institutions
vs Organizations as Markets: Disentangling Some
Fundamental Concepts". Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organizations. 28 (3): 161-182
Rindfleisch, Aric and Jan B. Heide 1997 «
Transaction Cost Analysis : Past, Present and
Future Applications ». Journal of Marketing,
61 (October) : 30-54
Simon, Herbert A. 1979 "Rational Decision
Making in Business Organizations". American
Economic Review. 69 (4): 493-513.
*Williamson, Oliver E. 1993 "Transaction
Cost Economics and Organization Theory".
Industrial and Corporate Change. 2 (2): 107-156.
**Williamson, Oliver E. 1999b « The New
Institutional Economics : Taking Stock/looking
ahead ». Address to the Annual Conference
of ISNIE, ISNIE-Newsletter, 2 (2) : Fall. Revised
in 2000, Journal of Economic Literature. 37 (3):
595-613
2ª Sessão: The trade-off
among modes of organizations. Impact of public
policies.
• From transaction costs to modes of organization:
the discrete alignment principle.
• A heuristic model. Its extension to the
three families of modes of organization.
• A paradigmatic application: Vertical Integration.
• The impact of public policies on the trade-offs.
• Empirical test: Modes of organization
in the automobile industry
Reading List
*Alchian, Armen; Crawford, Robert G.; Klein, Benjamin
1978 "Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process".
Journal of Law and Economics. 21 (2): 297-326
**Bajari, P and Stephen Tadelis 2001 « Incentives
versus Transaction Costs : A Theory of Procurement
Contracts » Rand Journal of Economics, 32
(3) : 387-407
Holmstrom, Bengt 1999, ‘The Firm as a Subeconomy’,
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15
(1), 74–102
Lyons, Bruce R. 1995 « Specific Investment,
Economies of Scale, and the Make-or-Buy Decision
: A Test of Transaction Cost Theory ». Journal
of Economic Behavior and Oganization, 26() : 431-443.
**Masten, Scott, James Meehan and Edward Snyder
1991 "The Costs of Organization". Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization. 7 (1): 1-25.
Monteverde, Kirk C. and David J. Teece 1982a "Suppliers
Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the
Automobile Industry". Bell Journal of Economics.
13 (1): 206-213
**Williamson, Oliver E. 1991 "Comparative
Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete
Structural Alternatives". Administrative
Science Quarterly. 36 (2): 269-296.
3ª Sessão: Coordination issues:
The nature and role of contracts.
• The centrality of contracts in a market
economy/ Why? But also limits.
• The concept of contract. Diverging views,
fundamental characteristics
• Role of contracts: Functions, means, failures.
• Contracts and modes of organization.
• Empirical test: The provision of water
in developing countries.
Reading List
George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy
2002, ‘Relational Contracts and the Theory
of the Firm’, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
117 (1), 39-84
**Cheung, Steven 1983 "The Contractual Nature
of the Firm". Journal of Law and Economics.
26 (1): 1-22.
**Joskow, Paul 1987 "Contract Duration and
Relationship-specific Investment: Empirical Evidence
from the Coal Market". American Economic
Review. 77 (May): 168-185.
Macaulay, Stewart 1963 "Non Contractual Relations
in Business: A Preliminary Study". American
Sociological Review. 28 (1): 55-67.
Masten, Scott E (ed) 1996 Case Studies in Contracting
and Organization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
*Masten, Scott and Stephane Saussier 2002 “Econometrics
of Contracts: An Assessment of Developments in
the Empirical Literature on Contacting”.
In E. Brousseau and J.M. Glachant (eds), The Economics
of Contracts, Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University
Press. pp. 273-292.
**Menard, Claude 1996 “On Clusters, Hybrids
and other Strange Forms. The Case of the French
Poultry Industry”. Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics, 152 (1): 154-183
Menard, Claude and Stéphane Saussier “
Contractual Choice and Performance” . In
Eric
Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant (eds.), The
Economics of Contracts. Theory and Applications.
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. Pp.
440-462
Mulherin, J.H. 1986 "Complexity in Long-Term
Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual
Provisions". Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization. 2(1): 105-108
*Saussier, Stephane 2000 “Contractual Completeness
and Transaction Costs”, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 42 (2): 189-206.
*Williamson, Oliver E. 1979 "Transaction
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations". Journal of Law and Economics.
22 (2): 3-61
4ª Sessão: Hybrid modes of
organization.
• The diversity of interfirm agreements.
• Three fundamental properties
• Modalities of governance within hybrid
arrangements
• Potential impact of public policies
• Application: hybrid arrangements in the
agri-food sector.
Reading List
Dyer, Jeffrey H. 1997 “Effective Interfirm
Collaboration: How Firms Minimize Transaction
Costs and Maximize Transaction Value”. Strategic
Management Journal, 18 (7): 535-556
*Grandori, Anna and Giuseppe Soda 1995, «
Inter-firm Networks : Antecedents, Mechanisms
and Forms” Organization Studies, 16 (2):
183-214
*Lafontaine, Francine and Kathrin Shaw 1999 “The
Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from
Panel Data” Journal of Political Economy,
107: 1041-1080
**Menard, Claude 2004 “The Economics of
Hybrid Organizations”, Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics (forthcoming)
**Oxley, Johan R. 1999 « Institutional Environment
and the Mechanism of Governance : the Impact of
Intellectual Property Protection on the Structure
of Inter-firm Alliances ». Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 38 : 283-309
Powell, Water 1990 « Neither Market nor
Hierarchy : Network Forms of Organization ».
In L.L. Cummpings and Barry Staw (eds), Readings
in Organizational Behavior, Greenwich, Conn. :
JAI Press (Greenwich, Conn.), 12 : 295-336
*Powell, Walter 1996 « Inter-organizational
Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry »
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
152 (1) : 197-215
5ª Sessão: Private norms,
public standards. Mechanisms of implementation
• Private order: from hierarchy to forms
of mutual commitments.
• Problems of implementation: reputation,
punishment and their limits. The credibility issue
• Public standards and the violence of the
State
• Main tools of public regulation in a democratic
market economy
• Private versus Public Costs of Transacting.
Reading List
*Joskow, Paul 1997 « Restructuring, Competition
and Regulatory Reform in the US Electricity Sector
». Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11
(3) : 119-138.
**Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack 1997 «
Why don’t Poor Countries Catch up ? A Cross-National
Test of an Institutional Explanation ».
Economic Inquiry, 35 (July) : 590-601
Keefer, Philipp and Mary Shirley 2000 “Formal
versus Informal Institutions in economic Development”.
In Menard (ed.), Institutions,Contracts and Organizations.
Cheltenham: E. Elgar, pp. 88-107
*Alston, Lee, Gary Libecap and Bernardo Mueller
1997 “Violence and the Development of Property
Rights to Land in the Brazilian Amazon”.
In Drobak, John and John Nye (eds) The Frontiers
of the New Institutional Economics, San Diego:
Academic Press, pp. 145-164
**Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller 1994 « The
Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment"
» Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
9 (Fall) : 201-246.
Menard, Claude 1994 "Organizations as Coordinating
Devices". Metroeconomica. 45 (3): 224-247
**Menard, Claude and Mary Shirley 2002 “Cities
Awash: Reforming Water Supply in Developing Countries”.
In M. Shirley (ed) Thirsting for Efficiency: The
Economics and Politics of Urban Water Reforms.
Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1-42
Conclusion
North, Duglass C., 1990. “A Transaction
Cost Theory of Politics. Journal of Theoretical
Politics 2(4), 355-367.
Greif, Avner., 1998. “Historical and Comparative
Institutional Analysis. The New Isntitutional
Economics. Vol. 88 no. 2.pp. 80-84.
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